Fitchs Paradox of Knowability

Fitchs Paradox of Knowability

Lambert M. Surhone, Miriam T. Timpledon, Susan F. Marseken

     

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Издательство: Книга по требованию
Дата выхода: июль 2011
ISBN: 978-6-1311-8071-2
Объём: 72 страниц
Масса: 129 г
Размеры(В x Ш x Т), см: 23 x 16 x 1

High Quality Content by WIKIPEDIA articles! Fitch's paradox of knowability is one of the fundamental puzzles of epistemic logic. It provides a challenge to the knowability thesis, which states that any truth is, in principle, knowable. The paradox is that this assumption implies the omniscience principle, which asserts that any truth is, in actual fact, known. Essentially, Fitch's paradox asserts that the existence of an unknown truth is unknowable. So if all truths were knowable, it would follow that all truths are in fact known. The paradox is of concern for verificationist or anti-realist accounts of truth, for which the knowability thesis is very plausible, but the omniscience principle is very implausible.

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