Repeated game

Repeated game

Frederic P. Miller, Agnes F. Vandome, John McBrewster

     

бумажная книга



Издательство: Книга по требованию
Дата выхода: июль 2011
ISBN: 978-6-1325-6993-6
Объём: 124 страниц
Масса: 209 г
Размеры(В x Ш x Т), см: 23 x 16 x 1

High Quality Content by WIKIPEDIA articles! In game theory, a repeated game (supergame or iterated game) is an extensive form game which consists in some number of repetitions of some base game (called a stage game). The stage game is usually one of the well-studied 2-person games. It captures the idea that a player will have to take into account the impact of his current action on the future actions of other players; this is sometimes called his reputation. The presence of different equilibrium properties is because the threat of retaliation is real, since one will play the game again with the same person. It can be proved that every strategy that has a payoff greater than the minmax payoff can be a Nash Equilibrium, which is very large set of strategies. Single stage game or single shot game are names for non-repeated games.

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