Strategic Misrepresentation

Strategic Misrepresentation

Lambert M. Surhone, Miriam T. Timpledon, Susan F. Marseken

     

бумажная книга



Издательство: Книга по требованию
Дата выхода: июль 2011
ISBN: 978-6-1304-9643-2
Объём: 88 страниц
Масса: 153 г
Размеры(В x Ш x Т), см: 23 x 16 x 1

High Quality Content by WIKIPEDIA articles! Strategic misrepresentation is the planned, systematic distortion or misstatement of fact—lying—in response to incentives in the budget process. Examples of strategic misrepresentation in budgeting illustrate that it is a contingent strategy responsive to a system of rewards in a highly competitive game where resource constraints are present. Not all budget advocacy requires or involves misrepresentation, nor is all budgetary strategy intended to misrepresent. Strategic misrepresentation is a predictable response to the incentive structure of the budgetary game (see also principal-agent problem); it is used because it works under some circumstances. It is used both by budget advocates and controllers and at times by both sides of the left-right political spectrum.

Данное издание не является оригинальным. Книга печатается по технологии принт-он-деманд после получения заказа.

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